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I.  Introduction 
As a member of the Chambre during the July Monarchy, Tocqueville often 
reminded his fellow deputies that seeing new worlds prevents intellectual self-delusion 
and corrects political judgment.  In Democracy in America, as well as in his 
parliamentary speeches and pamphlets, he drew heavily on the legitimacy conferred by 
“eye-witnessing.”
1 Indeed, the authority of the first-hand, filtered through an acute 
intelligence and expressed with deceptively classical simplicity, became Tocqueville’s 
writerly signature. There has been much controversy, however, about the extent to which 
Tocqueville saw America primarily through European lenses, and about whether he 
actually learned anything of importance there. It is one of the virtues of the Nolla critical 
edition of the Democracy, now made available to English readers, to show that viewing 
the United States first hand—its culture, society, politics, and predicaments—was 
decisive for the formation of his view of democracy as well as for his self-presentation as 
a truth-telling traveler.
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“Seeing Africa” was to play an analogous role in Tocqueville’s writing and 
political rhetoric. In his first letter on Algeria, written to bolster his parliamentary 
candidacy, Tocqueville notes that he has not been to Africa, though he is not so foolish as 
to boast of it.
3 After he had visited Algeria, he did not fail to exploit this privileged access 
in his speeches and reports (“if the Chamber will permit me to speak only of my own 
personal experience. . . I am profoundly convinced of the opposite”).
4 In this essay, I ask 
how we should evaluate Tocqueville’s encounter with Africa within the context of his 
larger voyage into the territory of modern democracy. What were his justifications for the 
imperialist move into Africa? What lessons did he (and should we) draw out of this 
theoretical voyage?  
II.  Into Africa: Tocqueville’s imperial voice 
Compared to other nineteenth-century European imperial ventures, the French 
conquest of North Africa was relatively long, violent, and destructive. After displacing 
the Turks in 1830, France was at first unsure about how to consolidate her position. This 
indecision changed, however, with the emergence of significant resistance under Abd-el-
Kader, a charismatic young religious and political leader who united Arab forces in the 
mid 1830s. Eventually the French decided to establish military dominance over the entire 
territory, a decision leading to a costly war that ended only in 1847. The struggle for 
control over Arab territory—the term of art began to be “pacification”—was entwined 
with an ambitious but “anarchical” policy of European colonization.
5 
For many years, the war in North Africa appeared to be a matter of one step 
forward, two steps back. In 1840, however, Governor-General Thomas Bugeaud 
formalized the goal of total conquest and systematized the war’s sporadically brutal Welch, “Out of Africa: Tocqueville’s Imperial Voyage’s -  page 3 of 36 
tactics. Under his command, mobile columns of French troops deliberately ravaged all 
territory not under French control in order to prevent Arabs from sowing, harvesting, and 
grazing.
6 The aim of these successful razzia was to instill terror and destroy tribal 
cohesion by taking war to the civilian population in Arab villages. The predictable result 
was disease, famine, and eventual Arab disaffection from the war effort.
7 Beyond the use 
of razzia, Bugeaud defended controversial episodes of mass killings of civilians by 
French officers as salutary episodes of terror that would hasten the end of the war.
8  
In the seventeen years until conquest was attained, there was a high degree of 
self-consciousness among members of the French political class about the aims and 
conduct of this colonial war. In pamphlets and in the Chamber of Deputies they debated 
the potential value of any North African possession, the wisdom of colonization, the 
organization of the settler colony, the rationality of apparently ever-expanding military 
operations, the morality of French conduct of the war, the frightening “barbarism” of the 
enemy, and the nature of military/civilian relations in a democratic regime. Tocqueville 
was a keen participant in these debates. 
A.  Tocqueville and “la grande affaire d’Afrique” 
Shortly after the dispatch of French troops to blockade (and eventually to seize) 
Algiers, Tocqueville discussed this expedition in letters to his brother Edouard. Like most 
of the French political class, he believed that the alleged trigger—the need to avenge a 
slight to the French envoy—was merely a cynical ploy by Charles X to shore up the 
Government’s popularity before parliamentary elections.
9 More important for his 
subsequent defense of French policy in Africa, however, Tocqueville was struck by the 
tendency of this incident to mute petty partisanship. There was, he noted, “truly a Welch, “Out of Africa: Tocqueville’s Imperial Voyage’s -  page 4 of 36 
national spirit in the way in which this question has reunited opinions.”
10 Although his 
trip to America and the writing of the two Democracies absorbed much of his energy 
during the next decade, Tocqueville continued to follow events in Africa closely, even 
thinking briefly of settling there.
11 
In 1837 Tocqueville launched his first election campaign by writing two “Letters 
on Algeria” that acknowledged many mistakes in the French conduct of the war, but 
nevertheless looked forward to a revitalization of North Africa, to “two peoples of 
different civilizations [managing] to refound themselves as a single whole.”
12 He painted 
an optimistic portrait in which the French would hold North Africa with the willing 
consent and support of the indigenous populations. A year later he began to read the 
Koran, hoping to find points of affinity between Muslim and Christian doctrine that 
would ease such a joint venture.
13 Tocqueville traveled to Algeria for the first time in 
May of 1841 as part of an official parliamentary group, and on his return wrote a 
substantial “Travail sur l’Algérie,” concluding grimly that his former hope to fuse the two 
populations had been a chimera.
14 Now his focus was on the need to quell resistance as 
quickly as possible, on the morally dubious measures that were necessary for such a 
victory (a war in which “we burn harvests, . . . empty silos, and finally. . . seize unarmed 
men, women and children”), on the relationship between domination and colonization, 
and on the pressing challenges involved in implanting a successful European colony.
15 
It is clear from these writings that Tocqueville was a steadfast proponent of 
French emigration to Africa to create a settler society, and that by 1837 he was convinced 
of the need to control a substantial part of the territory (in contrast to limited or restrained 
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among the center left groups in the Chamber with which he was loosely aligned. For the 
most part, he supported the Ministry on Algerian policy, even though he remained a sharp 
critic of its implementation.  He supported Bugeaud’s scorched earth policies as 
necessary to break the hold of Abd-al-Kader on the tribes and had by 1840 completely 
given up on any “quick, brilliant, honorable” end to the war.
16  
In a characteristic reach for a comparative perspective, Tocqueville began in the 
early 1840s to envision writing several articles on “the causes that produced and that 
sustain the astonishing greatness of the English in India.”
  This subject was central, he 
wrote in a letter to Buloz, since “the crux of all great European affairs lies in Asia. This is 
particularly so for us now that we have the colony of Algeria.”
17 The implicit contrast 
between successful Britain and struggling France, bogged down in a battle to pacify 
North Africa and regularize her rule, is clear in the organization of his reading notes on 
India and in the draft of the first part of this projected work.
18  
Tocqueville gave his only major speech on Algeria in June of 1846, followed by a 
second three-month trip to Africa. As victory finally appeared imminent, and driven by 
the desire to “see and judge African affairs for myself,” he toured Algeria from October 
to December 1846.
19 His study of the country during this trip, as well as the perspective 
on arcana imperii he had gained by his study of India, are reflected in the two long 
parliamentary reports that he wrote in 1847 as the rapporteur of a legislative committee 
on the organization of the peace and the future of the colony. 
In what ways are Tocqueville’s journeys into Africa analogous to those earlier 
trips to America, England, and Ireland that provided much of the raw material for 
Democracy in America? In 1841, until illness forced his return from Algeria to France, Welch, “Out of Africa: Tocqueville’s Imperial Voyage’s -  page 6 of 36 
Tocqueville kept a diary in which he recorded long passages from his interlocutors’ 
conversations, and his own vivid first impressions. 
First appearance of the town: I have never seen anything like it. Prodigious mix of 
races and costumes, Arab, Kabyle, Moor, Negro, Mahonais, French. Each of these 
races, tossed together in a space much too tight to contain them, speaks its 
language, wears its attire, displays different mores. This whole world moves about 
with an activity that seems feverish. The entire lower town seems in a state of 
destruction and reconstruction. On all sides, one sees nothing but recent ruins, 
buildings going up; one hears nothing but the noise of the hammer. It is 
Cincinnati transported onto the soil of Africa.
20  
He also reported in a series of letters to friends and family. As in his earlier voyages, we 
find him grilling his informants, always returning to the central questions that preoccupy 
him, and trying out formulations of ideas that later appear in his manuscripts and 
published works. He is at once observer, thinker, and potential pedagogue. What he says 
at the beginning of Democracy in America (in a passage suppressed in the published 
edition) will be quite true of his Algerian texts as well: “the work that you are about to 
read is not a travelogue.”
21 But when he visited Boston, London, or Dublin, Tocqueville 
was primarily a private citizen and a passionately curious intellectual, on the lookout for 
ways to refine and elaborate his general idées mères about the effects of the democratic 
revolution and its impact in different societies. In Africa he was not merely a citizen but a 
representative of France, not just an intellectual but an official partly responsible for 
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French civil and military officials, rather than among colonists or indigènes, supply a 
narrower type of knowledge.  
America and England appear in Tocqueville’s texts as teeming laboratories for 
studying modern political culture and for identifying the possible interactions among 
ideas, institutions, and political action. They offer a fertile mix of familiarity and 
distance: close enough to be brought into the same comparative frame, far enough away 
to induce analytical clarity through a productive sense of wonder.  Africa, on the other 
hand, seems less an open territory over which his thought roams freely than a restricted 
field of interrogation or, as Jennifer Pitts has put it, “a laboratory for ideas of 
governance.”
22 It is not that he is unwilling to face uncomfortable facts—he details the 
failings of France with sometimes brutal clarity—but the range of his imaginative 
sympathy is reduced. Tocqueville does not forget that Africa is there to be mastered even 
more than understood. 
As Tocqueville’s writings on empire have become more available in translation, 
and as both Anglophone and Francophone political theorists have begun to grapple with 
the transnational aspects of liberal democratic theory, scholars have increasingly puzzled 
over the dissonance between Tocqueville’s imperial and liberal voices. One fault line in 
these debates centers on the question of whether the apparent tension between 
Tocqueville’s defense of French imperialism and his liberalism is illusory or real. 
Tzvetan Todorov and Stéphane Dion, for example, construe Tocqueville as a proponent 
of realpolitik who believed that the claims of justice stopped at national borders. By 
projecting the liberal rights of individuals onto sovereign national entities acting in an 
anarchic international state of nature, Tocqueville could put French national interests first Welch, “Out of Africa: Tocqueville’s Imperial Voyage’s -  page 8 of 36 
without inconsistency. Thus there is no real paradox to be explained.
23 Tocqueville, 
however, was never a liberal social contract theorist in the classical sense. Moreover, he 
always maintained that national majorities are not morally free to do whatever they 
choose either within or beyond their borders. Thus this interpretation rather implausibly 
ignores a wealth of textual evidence. In contrast, beginning with Melvin Richter’s classic 
article “Tocqueville on Algeria,” more careful readers have perceived a real interpretive 
conundrum in Tocqueville’s inconsistent universalism.
 What Roger Boesche has recently 
called the “dark side of Tocqueville,” his apparent readiness to ignore the insights of his 
own liberalism, has called for explanation and contextualization.
24 How did he square his 
commitment to liberty with his embrace of permanent colonial domination? 
B.  Arguments for Empire 
Tocqueville himself does not directly address the normative issues of whether and 
when the aggression of one nation against another can be considered just. On the 
contrary, he assumes that conquest is a fact of political life, both in aristocratic and 
democratic times. This assumption does not mean, however, that one cannot distinguish 
morally better and worse types of domination. In his various discussions of the Spanish 
conquistadores, the Anglo-American encounters with indigenous peoples, and the 
English in Ireland, the following distinctions emerge. The conquered may be assimilated 
and treated humanely (good) or shunned and exploited (bad), or driven away, even 
exterminated (very bad).
25 One may also condemn deliberate bad faith and warfare that is 
more barbarous than necessity requires. These moral judgments sporadically surface in 
his writings on Algeria and India, but for the most part he ruthlessly disregards them, Welch, “Out of Africa: Tocqueville’s Imperial Voyage’s -  page 9 of 36 
defending the war against the Arabs and the invasive colonization project as vital for 
France.
26 
Scholars have identified three kinds of arguments in Tocqueville’s texts justifying 
the conquest of Asian or African territories by European powers: the requirement of a 
great power to maintain international standing by projecting “grandeur,” the beneficial 
effects on domestic politics and nation-building, and a duty to civilize the uncivilized (the 
infamous mission civilisatrice). The first two, closely linked in his mind, are quite evident 
in Tocqueville’s discussions of the French in North Africa and the English in India. The 
third, however, is a trickier business. In context, Tocqueville appears the most tepid of 
civilizers. Given his rich sociological appreciation of the persistence of moeurs, and his 
dread of imposing uniformity on plurality, this hesitance to embrace a civilizing mission 
is not surprising. 
1. International imperatives 
From his first speech in the Chamber (expressing outrage and even threatening 
war because of the pointed exclusion of France from the settlement of the eastern 
question) it was clear that Tocqueville believed that the primary goal of French foreign 
policy must be to reclaim her rightful position in Europe. The debacle of the 
revolutionary and imperial years had damaged France’s standing among the great 
civilized nations. To play this role again she needed to project her power on a par with 
the other great nations, especially England.
27 Success in Algeria was key to this parity. 
The great project of launching a civilized colony in Africa would help France reclaim her 
role as an equal arbiter of Europe’s destiny.
28 Indeed, if France abandoned North Africa, 
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advantages in power and prestige. By the late 1830s Tocqueville is convinced that retreat 
would be ruinous. To withdraw from Africa would disgrace France and weaken her 
beyond repair in Europe, which would regard this action as “yielding to her own 
impotence and succumbing to her own lack of courage.”
29As Hugh Brogan has noted, 
this was the logic of Pericles: “‘you now hold your empire down by force; it may have 
been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go.’”
30 The argument for French 
grandeur, however, was not merely a matter of national hubris. Tocqueville believed that 
France had an obligation to assume the responsibilities of a great power, to set civilized 
norms, to arbitrate disputes, and to counteract the influence of other powers. Re-
establishing the preeminence of France would indirectly promote the interests of Europe 
and the stability of the international system.
31 To abandon this duty was shameful.  
  2.  Domestic drama 
A second reason for persisting in Algeria was the impact of the French colonizing 
venture on domestic French politics, in particular the provision of a dramatic common 
focus and the diffusion of class rancor. Drawn into an imaginative vision that transcended 
petty self-interest, all citizens could find in this expansion into a new world a patriotic 
renewal of faith in la grande nation. Tocqueville, of course, believed that this capacity to 
subordinate personal interest to the good of the whole was the sine qua non of a free 
people. He was struck again and again by the ability of the English to sustain such cross-
class cooperation and he saw a common pride in their Indian “possession” as an 
important ingredient in this mix.
32 Unlike some on the left, Tocqueville doubted that 
France could successfully expand towards the Rhine, a foreign policy course that would 
cause Europe to close ranks against her. But the conquest and colonization of Algeria Welch, “Out of Africa: Tocqueville’s Imperial Voyage’s -  page 11 of 36 
offered a glorious outlet. André Jardin has commented that Tocqueville saw the African 
venture as a way to unite the political class (le pays légal) with the rest of the country (le 
pays réel).
33 Projecting French power into the world indirectly built domestic bridges. 
3. A civilizing mission? 
A third potential argument justifying French domination over the Arabs and 
Kabyles of North Africa, and European rule over “barbarous” countries in general, is the 
right and duty of the advanced to rule the backward in order to civilize them. All careful 
readers of Tocqueville have noted that he thoroughly rejected racial arguments for the 
inferiority of a people, but it is just as clear that he accepted cultural and historical ones. 
He believed that peoples become enlightened at different rates, that enlightenment entails 
economic and social development, that development brings power, and that the power of 
civilized nations seduces the less civilized. These beliefs underlie Tocqueville’s 
discussion of relations among European nations no less than his understanding of 
Europe’s colonial diaspora.
34 And in these assumptions, Tocqueville reflected a widely-
accepted theory that all peoples pass through the stages of hunting/gathering, herding, 
and agriculture before arriving at civilization.  Adopting contemporary usage, 
Tocqueville often referred to hunter-gatherers as savage, while conflating pastoral and 
agricultural stages as barbaric or imperfectly civilized.  
Tocqueville had no doubt that civilization definitively transformed the pattern of 
confrontation and conflict among nations by privileging the European powers.
35 But this 
belief in European superiority does not mean that he appealed to civilization as a defense 
of empire in anything like the strong manner used by English liberals or many of his 
French contemporaries. If a “civilizing mission” calls for the deliberate conversion of Welch, “Out of Africa: Tocqueville’s Imperial Voyage’s -  page 12 of 36 
indigenous peoples to European civilization through education, missionary efforts, or 
state policy, with the aim of eventually transforming native law, custom, and religious 
practice, then in Tocqueville the call was faint. 
In exploring the question of the ways in which Tocqueville saw the right and duty 
to civilize connected to European colonial rule, we first must take heed of a key 
distinction that runs through everything Tocqueville has to say about expansion into new 
worlds: the difference between domination (ruling a defeated population) and 
colonization (displacing or replacing a part or the whole of that population).
36 There can 
be domination without significant colonization (for example the case of Ottoman Algeria 
or British India); colonization without domination (if the territory is “empty,” or if the 
indigenous population dies out or is exterminated, as sometimes happened in North 
America or the Caribbean); or a combination of domination and colonization (the French 
in Algeria). Tocqueville’s civilizing rhetoric must be understood in relation to these 
different sorts of imperial expansion. 
a.  Domination tout court: Turks and Brits 
Invasion and domination of one people by another is an old story. It is what the 
Turks did in Algeria, and Tocqueville sometimes uses the phrase “to rule in the manner 
of the Turks” as a short-hand for dominating another country successfully with the tacit 
consent of the conquered, a consent inferred by the lack of overt resistance.  Indeed, he 
does not always use the phrase “in the manner of the Turks” in a pejorative way. It 
sometimes just means the shrewd and prudent administration of a foreign country (in 
one’s own interest to be sure) by judiciously dividing and conquering and by conciliating 
key members of the defeated elites. But sometimes he does seem to condemn rule “in the Welch, “Out of Africa: Tocqueville’s Imperial Voyage’s -  page 13 of 36 
manner of the Turks.” Though they were not ineffective as conquerors, the Turks were 
too greedy and rapacious, a result of their own barbarism. For example they collected 
taxes from Arab and Berber indigènes to swell the coffers of the dey, without using those 
taxes to defray the expenses of governing the conquered territory, to maintain roads, or to 
dispense impartial justice.  
The British, Tocqueville notes, ruled India in the manner of the Turks—albeit as 
kinder, gentler Turks—and it is just this achievement that he initially admires. In his 
projected work on India, Tocqueville intended to capture the attention of his readers by 
first puncturing the myth of the supposedly great British feat in conquering the 
subcontinent. On the contrary, he argues, the conquest was completely understandable 
given the distraction of the French with revolution and war, the acquiescent nature of the 
major Indian religions, the indifference and self-sufficiency of Indian communes, the lack 
of Indian national feeling due to the caste system, the petty squabbling of Indian princes, 
and the familiarity of the Indians with rule by foreigners of another religion. Indeed, “the 
English were swept into domination of India by a current stronger than themselves.”
37 
What needs to be explained is something quite different: the ability of the British to 
organize the conquest and to govern India, despite many initial injustices and scandals, 
despite policies that impoverished the population, and despite such potentially disastrous 
mistakes as importing the complicated forms of British justice. The eventual 
establishment of regular and moderate government, of civilian control that was superior 
to the military but not itself above the law, of rule over a large diverse empire that 
forsook the imposition of uniformity or centralization, and of functional coordination Welch, “Out of Africa: Tocqueville’s Imperial Voyage’s -  page 14 of 36 
between the East India Company and the British state—these are the feats worthy of 
study. 
Tocqueville is quite clear that these achievements fall far short of bringing 
civilization to India. Despite pious and self-justifying rhetoric—they claim to do 
everything out of principle, or for the “good of the indigenous people,” or for the benefit 
of the very princes they are attempting to conquer—the British actually rule as milder and 
more skillful Turks. While they do use taxes raised from their subjects to defray the 
expenses of governing, they do nothing to revive the country, for example by building 
public works. “So far the English have ruled over India for themselves and not for her.”
38 
Moreover, according to Tocqueville, while Indian social structures were slowly 
beginning to weaken, the Indians gave no sign of wishing to adopt European civilization 
or religion. He writes in a marginal note that India cannot be civilized while she retains 
her religion, and a religion “of this kind” is so tightly mixed with the social state, morals, 
and laws that it is impossible to destroy, maintaining its hold even after people have 
ceased to believe in it. To civilize one must break into this “vicious circle,” a daunting 
and dangerous business. 
  Despite the British failure to bring either economic development or cultural 
change to India, Tocqueville holds up their ability to dominate the continent successfully 
as instructive for France. Having achieved her conquest of North Africa, France must not 
shrink from the little acts of violence necessary to consolidate it. In 1846 Tocqueville 
wrote a long revealing letter to General Lamoricière outlining the following possible 
“violences de détail” the French might adopt in Algeria to consolidate their rule.
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1) Turn the masses against the elites. A tried and true method of consolidating a 
new regime, this strategy probably would not work in Algeria, since elites had a religious 
hold on the people, and since the indigenous populations had not yet reached a social 
state that would make them susceptible to it. Tocqueville adds that such an appeal to the 
masses is, in any case, always dangerous. 
2) Give some families individual property in exchange for their tacit support of 
French seizure or “purchase” of tribal lands. 
3) Link the interests of some indigenous elites to the French by giving them 
property and power confiscated from unfriendly tribes. These elites will then become 
“usurpers like us,” and will deflect hatred of the French onto themselves. 
Though apparently callous, such measures, Tocqueville insists, correspond to the practice 
of all conquerors. He concludes: 
In places where no revolution occurred in ownership or in the social state, a 
revolution did nevertheless take place in the basis of political power. The locus of 
power shifted. The ambition of some was used to counter the hostility of others. 
This was the fundamental method of the English in India. Can nothing similar be 
done in Africa? If I'm not mistaken, political power was constituted in Algeria as 
it has always been in nations that are at once aristocratic and half-civilized: the 
government associated itself with part of the population in order to govern the 
rest. With the aid of certain privileged tribes, it acted on the remainder of the 
population. This was the method of the Turks. I believe that in this respect they 
were imitated by Abd-el-Kader, who probably did no more than transfer the Welch, “Out of Africa: Tocqueville’s Imperial Voyage’s -  page 16 of 36 
privilege from one set of hands to another. Why don't we do the same thing? 
[emphases added]
40 
Tocqueville assumes that for a very long time France will rule over the Arab indigènes in 
North Africa as “better” Turks.
 41  I take up a more detailed discussion of his view of the 
fate of the indigènes below.  
b.  Colonization 
The demands of civilized conquest—that is, acting as better Turks—appear in 
Tocqueville’s writings to be more arduous than awe-inspiring. France was struggling, he 
admitted in 1841, even to do as well as the “barbarous” Turks or the Arabs, whose 
actions could sometimes be construed as more civilized than those of the French.
42 Much 
less keen on the domination of Algeria than on the founding of a new society, 
Tocqueville supported the conquest only because he believed it necessary for the safety 
and growth of a French/European colony. “Colonization is not an accessory to the thing 
that we are doing in Africa, it is the thing itself.”
43 In a country like Algeria, with a 
restive warlike population and without truly settled agriculture or well-formulated notions 
of individual property, domination tout court, according to Tocqueville, would be 
precarious and unproductive. But colonization—founding a new society where freedom 
could flourish—engaged his deepest instincts. 
Colonization complicates the debate over whether Tocqueville believed in a 
civilizing mission, for some of his soaring rhetoric about the march of European 
civilization refers to the displacement rather than the development of populations. The 
valley of Metidja, he wrote from Algeria in a letter to Lanjuinais, appeared to be 
populated only by a few Arabs thrusting and parrying with knives. As such, it presented Welch, “Out of Africa: Tocqueville’s Imperial Voyage’s -  page 17 of 36 
“a spectacle at once admirable and saddening. In the hands of a civilized people this 
immense valley would be one of the most beautiful countries on earth.”
44 Tocqueville 
found the sheer spectacle of a dynamic European people transforming the desert into a 
developed commercial society to be a beautiful vision; a way for the French to make a 
striking move into the democratic future. 
III: Out of Africa: lessons for democratic founders 
A.  Une florissante nation 
The ideal of “a flourishing nation” in North Africa filled with roads, modern 
communications, capitalist agriculture, and energetic and self-interested colonists 
inspired in Tocqueville an awe surprisingly free from ambivalence.
45 Though always 
guarded in his writings on free trade in the context of economic policy in France, 
Tocqueville enthusiastically endorses “libre-échange” and its effects in his colonial 
writings.  Indeed, he hunts down all the economic errors committed in the European 
colony by misguided reformers who advocate collectivist schemes of colonization 
(whether military, socialist, monastic, or statist), and by military or civil officials who 
interfere in the economic affairs of the colony or arbitrarily suspend the rule of law.
46 
Unlike the English, who do not subsidize their emigrants, but merely assure them a new 
territory where property and contracts are safe from force and fraud, the French, 
according to Tocqueville, export their administrative penchant to micromanage 
everything, but fail to create a governmental structure with clear lines of responsibility. 
Indeed, the French have created a bureaucratic nightmare worse than anything found in 
France itself.
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In his second “Letter on Algeria,” Tocqueville had argued that the alleged decline 
of the religious motive and the rise of material interest among indigenous peoples were 
among the most hopeful signs for their joining the French in a new civilization.
48 In the 
1840s, when he had abandoned his earlier belief in these signs, he champions the cause of 
the economic colonists against the military, who manifest an imbecilic irritation with the 
colonists’ desire to make money.
49 From a limited military point of view, Tocqueville 
admired French warriors in Africa, but he also believed that they “take on distorted 
proportions in the public imagination” and that their influence in the colony should be 
restricted.
50 It is not the exploits of citizen soldiers like Cincinnatus that capture his 
imagination, but rather the “heroic” creation of a commercial “Cincinnati transported 
onto the soil of Africa.”
51   
Tocqueville focuses above all on establishing a viable agricultural colony, 
commercially profitable and based on the “allure of gain and comfort.”
52 He is absorbed 
in the need to attract independent capital, circulate credit, speed up the workings of the 
profit motive, and open up French markets to the colonists. “[W]hen [the colonist] is not 
exposing his own resources or counting on himself alone, he rarely displays that ardor, 
tenacity, and intelligence that make capital productive.” The objective is not to benefit 
economic interests in France (in the short term those interests may even suffer) but to 
create a vital economic and civic society peopled by colonists with “ardor, tenacity, and 
intelligence” who make both capital productive and (eventually) local civic life possible. 
Tocqueville’s hope is that the state can create the conditions for this new society: civil 
and economic freedoms that will reinforce each other to create an invigorated character, 
“free, passionate and energetic.
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that a new colonial venture—less like the old French empire in Canada and Louisiana and 
more like the vigorous English colonies in America—might create an inspiring 
monument to the glory of the French.
54 
Some characterizations of Tocqueville’s analysis of the sources of vitality in 
American democracy overstate the extent to which he thought civic energy flowed from 
public to private life, rather than in the other direction.
55 In Tocqueville’s America, we 
should remember, the qualities of independence and self-reliance needed for success in 
commerce tend to carry over into political life.
56 Good business requires steadiness, 
practical shrewdness, farsightedness, the ability to calculate risk, and a determination to 
beat the odds.  So too does free politics.  The trick is to create a structure in which these 
spillovers are productive, in which positive economic energies are harnessed to the public 
good. This vision is not bound geographically or conceptually to America. Tocqueville’s 
writings on Algeria (composed during the period of his greatest private criticism of the 
mediocrity, place-hunting, and individualism of the French middle-classes) remind us of 
the extent to which he saw economic and political liberalism both as mutually-reinforcing 
and in tension. When Tocqueville writes from the perspective of Algeria, where legal 
irregularities and military violence were the norm, the vision of a settled society that 
protected property and contracts takes on a positive allure. In 1841, for example, he 
contrasts what an ordinary citizen could expect in France—above all guaranteed property 
rights, settled civil law, independent magistrates, and some influence on events—with the 
horror of their absence in the Algerian colony. How, he despaired, could France attract 
rational economic immigrants to such a “miserably anarchic” place?
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Tocqueville’s embrace of economic civil society in Africa is all the more 
surprising in that the self-governing aspects of such a democratic society are muted. 
While he hopes that civil and political freedoms will eventually flourish in Algeria—
indeed, without collective interests and actions there will be no “society”—he condones 
short-term restrictions on the press, a system of advisory councils that are appointed 
rather than elected, and tight control over all relations with the indigenes: ‘the electoral 
system, freedom of the press, the jury. These institutions are not necessary for the infancy 
of societies.”
58 Tempering his enthusiasm for the potential future of the settler colony was 
the sober recognition that it was being formed amidst a sea of Arab enmity, and was 
populated by flawed immigrants whose passions could not be allowed free reign. The 
metropole had to police the fragile borders between two peoples, isolate the Europeans 
from the simmering resentment and hatred of the indigènes, and protect the natives from 
the aggression and intolerance of the settlers. 
B.  Les anciens habitants de l’Algérie 
In his “First Report on Algeria,” written on the eve of victory, Tocqueville speaks 
about the obligation of the French to govern the “old inhabitants of Algeria” with 
decency, that is, to provide “a power that guides them, not only toward our interest, but in 
theirs. . . that works ardently for the continual development of their imperfect society . . . 
that does not restrict itself to exploiting them.”
59 But, Tocqueville admits, these 
sentiments are aspirations: statements of what ought to be “the permanent tendency and 
the general spirit of our government.”
60 When he turns to concrete details of French 
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course act with humanity and justice, the true difficulty of maintaining a balance between 
“our interest” and “theirs” emerges. 
1.  A public agenda for Algeria  
The problem of acquiring territory for European settlement—not just any 
territory, but “the most fertile, best-irrigated, best-prepared lands”—was perhaps the most 
difficult policy issue facing the French.
61  Stubbornly attached to the American analogy, 
Tocqueville argues that Algeria was sparsely settled by peoples who, if not true nomads, 
were still “mobile” and had not developed settled agriculture. Thus there was room for 
French settlement.
62 Although he warns against “deceitful or derisory transactions” (the 
clear reference here is to the Americans’ duplicitous treatment of the Indians), against 
confiscation without indemnity, and against expulsion from the land, he still thinks it is 
possible to gain access to land “either in concessions of rights, or in an exchange of 
lands.”
 63 He is referring here to the practice that he had mentioned in his letter to 
Lamoricière, that is, inviting Arabs to cede lands to the French state that they did not 
“need,” in exchange for recognition of their individual or collective ownership of lands it 
allowed them to keep.  Known as “cantonnement” (delimitation), such a policy was in 
fact pursued by the French and was deeply resented by the Arabs as unjust. In practice it 
rapidly did turn into a policy of “refoulement” (expulsion from territory), helping to 
reopen an era of insurrection in 1859, the year of Tocqueville’s death.
64 
A second issue was how to make the goal of “working ardently for their 
development” more than empty rhetoric in a society structured around inequality. At the 
very least Tocqueville thought the French needed to address the damage they had done to 
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charitable institutions, but warns against going too far in that direction.
65  Next the French 
must abstain from interfering in Muslim religious institutions or civil law, which would 
dishonor the peace they had made with the indigènes.  Tocqueville foresaw the creation 
of a permanently segregated society, and was opposed even to admitting young Arabs to 
French schools, since it would be “as dangerous as it would be useless to seek to suggest 
to them our mores, our ideas, our customs.”
66 Indigenous society, then, should be pushed 
only in the “direction proper to it.” By this phrase, Tocqueville seems to mean that any 
voluntary movement toward European notions of individual property and labor should be 
encouraged, and that Arabs should be able to sell their labor to Europeans. “The 
European needs the Arab to make his lands valuable; the Arab needs the European to 
obtain a high salary.”
67 It is hard to see how this “community of interests” (a sort of 
internal guest worker policy) could be expected to reconcile the Arabs to the French 
presence, especially since it was combined with exclusion from the political community.  
Tocqueville is quite clear that the Arabs were to be governed from above, that is, would 
be granted no civil guarantees beyond the provisions of Muslim civil law and no political 
rights. He thought it would be suicidal for the French to forget that the Arabs’ war-like 
nature and legitimate grievances made them a formidable potential military threat; the 
Arab indigènes must be ruled by what amounted to a law of exception, and subject to 
summary imprisonment or exile.
68  
The Kabyles (Berbers) posed a different problem. Settled agricultural peoples 
ensconced in mountain areas and fervently attached to the soil, they could be brought 
within the French orbit by a hands-off policy. One certainly shouldn’t try to civilize them. 
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“speak about morality, civilization, fine arts, political economy, or philosophy,” “they 
would assuredly cut off your head.”
69  The Kabyles were not a threat to French 
colonization, as long as their lands weren’t confiscated or directly attacked. Tocqueville 
always vehemently opposed expeditions into Berber territories, which he thought foolish 
and unnecessary. If not attacked, the Kabyles would be peaceful trade partners and would 
accept living in the dominant orbit of the French as they had accepted the hegemony of 
the Turks. 
2.  Private doubts 
The dreaded example of American crimes against the Amerindians—expulsion  
and extermination—was frequently invoked in French debates about relations with the 
North African indigènes. In both public and private, Tocqueville strenuously denied that 
he or the French government had any such intentions, and there is no reason to doubt his 
sincerity. Nevertheless, Tocqueville thought that a very likely effect of prolonged contact 
between the “civilized” French and the “barbarous” Arabs would be to demoralize and 
dispirit the latter through no one’s explicit intention.
70 In his Essay on Algeria, never 
intended for publication in its unrevised state, he notes that those who have been to 
Algeria “know that this state of things seems to become more so every day, and that 
nothing can be done against it. The Arab element is becoming more and more isolated, 
and little by little, it is dissolving. The Muslim population always seems to be shrinking, 
while the Christian population is always growing.”
71 Tocqueville’s version of “lifting [the 
Arabs] in our arms toward well-being and enlightenment,” then, seems restricted to 
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contact from which he hoped rather vaguely that they would eventually profit, but which 
he believed was much more likely to produce demoralization and democratic decline. 
In 1846 Tocqueville had a telling public and private interchange with his friend 
and usual political ally, Francisque de Corcelle. A strong supporter of the conquest, 
Corcelle had turned a blind eye to the morally troubling slash and burn policies that 
brought success because he—like Tocqueville—had come to the conclusion that only by 
such policies would France ever defeat the Arabs. Corcelle, however, became alarmed at 
rhetoric in the colonial press that called for the extermination of the Arabs. In a long 
speech in the Chamber, he argued that having achieved military victory, the French now 
faced the urgent question of the treatment of the indigènes. Indeed he was a more active 
civilizer than Tocqueville, holding out modest hopes for conciliation and conversion of 
the Arabs by extending French law (which Tocqueville opposed) and by attracting Arab 
“colonists” to new villages (a process known as internal colonization). Increasingly 
religious, Corcelle also was more hopeful of eventual Christianization. He was even 
willing to consider supporting military colonization—Tocqueville’s bête noire—
precisely because he had become convinced that the army might be necessary in the 
countryside to protect the indigènes from settler violence. 
In public Tocqueville replied to Corcelle by misrepresenting his speech as a 
utopian hope to hold Algeria with the willing support of the Arabs. (Corcelle interjected, 
“I said nothing of the kind!”)
72 In private he acknowledged to Corcelle that the moral 
issue of what to do with the indigènes was very important, but establishing and protecting 
the European colony had to be the priority. In addressing Corcelle’s fears that 
extermination would be the result of French policies, Tocqueville asserts that to push for Welch, “Out of Africa: Tocqueville’s Imperial Voyage’s -  page 25 of 36 
the disappearance of the Arabs is cruel, absurd, and impractical. He adds, however: “but 
what should be done so that the two races enter into contact with one another? I confess 
with chagrin that here my mind is troubled and hesitates.”
73 Even more frank in a letter to 
Laromicière, he says that his own experience and his study of history have shown that 
when conquerors are both more civilized and stronger, they do not assimilate the 
conquered, but destroy or expel them. He ardently hopes the French will do better, but 
has little expectation of it.
74 The decline or disappearance of the Arabs in Algeria, like the 
Indians in America, then, is not something to be wished for, but it is something that may 
be over determined. Tocqueville’s conscience troubles him at the thought because he 
realizes that this decline of the Arabs would conveniently remove their threat to the 
colony and solve a thorny problem for the French. Since such a wish is criminal, it must 
be resolutely repressed. 
3.  Final thoughts: The Sepoy Rebellion 
Although Tocqueville says almost nothing about Algeria after 1849, he does 
revisit the question of European imperialism in a series of letters about the Sepoy 
Rebellion in 1857 and 1858. Estranged from his own imperial government and just home 
from a triumphant trip to England after the publication of L’Ancien régime et la 
révolution, Tocqueville was as well disposed to his “second homeland” as he ever would 
be.
75 His letters to English correspondents strike a uniformly sympathetic note of the 
following sort: your problems are our problems; my thoughts are with you in your hour 
of need, as should be those of all right-thinking Europeans! During the rebellion, he 
commiserates that English withdrawal from India would “be disastrous for the future of 
civilization and the progress of humanity.”
76  After the British have regained control, he Welch, “Out of Africa: Tocqueville’s Imperial Voyage’s -  page 26 of 36 
calls the British triumph a “victory for Christianity and civilization.”
77 But why exactly 
would British defeat have been a disaster, and what sort of victory had been won? I do 
not believe that Tocqueville thought that the calamity averted was the loss of British 
tutelage in India, or that the victory gained was the eventual Christianization and 
civilization of the Indian peoples. Rather a withdrawal from India would have been a 
great blow to English prestige and would have put in doubt the possibility of “civilized” 
imperial rule in general.
78 Civilized and humanitarian nations should be able to rule 
backward peoples more successfully and humanely than did semi-barbarous conquerors 
like the Turks. Though, like all conquerors, they have to depend to some degree on force 
and fraud, they can also bring to bear technical superiority, administrative regularity and 
fairness, and the moral suasion exerted by a higher level of civilization. To abandon India 
would be to undermine the European claim to a superior technical and moral civilization 
(a claim in which Tocqueville believes passionately and proudly) and to bring shame on 
civilization by exhibiting cowardice in times that call for steady resolve. Abandoning 
India would also, of course, produce collateral damage: discrediting the sole liberal state 
among the European great powers and destabilizing international relations, as well as 
endangering French rule in Africa.  
This whole episode, however, also causes Tocqueville to rethink his previous 
judgment that English rule in India constituted a successful model of rule as  “better 
Turks.”  He now looks at English policy for mistakes rather than for positive lessons. 
Their very mildness allowed nationalism to grow and to swell into rebellion. At the same 
time they antagonized native elites through their haughty exclusivity. In fact, the English 
no longer look all that superior to the French. Moreover, Tocqueville now appears to be Welch, “Out of Africa: Tocqueville’s Imperial Voyage’s -  page 27 of 36 
more sensitive to the problem of indigenous elites who are treated as foreigners in their 
own land. After reading Reeve’s long piece about India in the Edinburgh Review of 
January 1858, an essay that proposes the introduction of a large English population into 
India, Tocqueville protests that such colonization would be a grave mistake that could 
only worsen England’s particular problems.
79 He does not retract his support for 
colonization in Africa but does betray a heightened awareness of the connection between 
a European presence and native resentment, noting that the Arabs and Kabyles in Algeria 
resented colonists much more than soldiers.
80 Moreover, thickly populated and 
agricultural, India was not a candidate for colonization or for the founding of a new 
society. The physical and moral issues of acquiring territory for settlement—difficult but 
not impossible in societies like North America and North Africa, according to 
Tocqueville—would be insoluble in India. Thus the English had no choice but to make a 
success of domination without colonization. 
After the Rebellion Tocqueville assumes that successful domination (holding 
India with the tacit consent of indigenous elites) would require some basic reforms. He is 
forced to confront the issue that was implicit but muted in his earlier work on India: what 
did civilized England owe to her Indian subjects?  While he repeats his judgment that the 
British have trumpeted a civilizing mission, but in a hundred years have done nothing to 
better the condition of their subjects, he is no longer content to pass over this hypocrisy 
with a few ironical comments. He now draws out the obvious inference. The English 
should have done better, and now must do better, or risk the loss of their empire. In a 
letter to Lord Hatherton, he notes “more could have been expected of them” than to have 
ruled like better Turks.
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What is the “more” that the British should have done? Their task was “not only to 
dominate India, but to civilize it. These two things, indeed, are closely connected.”
82  
Tocqueville seems to be calling here for a form of domination that will gradually provide 
Indians access to economic opportunity. At the very least the exploitative East India 
Company, which deliberately ruined native industries and put its own commercial 
interests above the well-being of Indian subjects, should be replaced by direct rule under 
the eye of Parliament and the public. He writes to Ampère that the rebellion shows that 
England must not only reconquer India, but govern in a new way.
83 Tocqueville’s 
correspondence with Reeve suggests that the new direction in British rule should focus 
on building an infrastructure of public works (roads, canals, and bridges) that will allow 
the country to become more self-sustaining and prosperous, with Indians eventually 
sharing in this development. Or, as he says to Lord Hatherton, “as the [British] 
government tends more and more to apply the general principles that make Europe rich 
and enlightened, it will little by little make the Indians feel the advantages of our 
civilization and will bring them closer to it.”
84 There is still, then, little taste for robust 
civilizing in the sense of transforming, educating, and moralizing a “backward” people. 
IV.  Conclusion 
Placing Tocqueville in the political landscape he inhabited allows us to 
understand why he succumbed to the temptation to ignore the claims of “imperfectly-
civilized” peoples to a free way of life. To have acknowledged such claims, he thought, 
would have led inevitably to the humiliation of France, the weakening of the system of 
civilized states, and the loss of an opportunity to strengthen France’s democratic political 
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dominance of the Arabs would be no worse than that of their own leaders or previous 
conquerors, and might eventually even improve their lot—if they survived the 
experiment. He resolutely repressed moral unease about violence—large and small—as a 
political burden that a statesman must bear. How accurate and insightful were 
Tocqueville’s judgments about European imperial and colonial aims and policies? Like 
Tocqueville himself, who dissected and criticized the ideas and policies of French ancien 
régime and revolutionary statesmen from the perspective of the political culture they 
inadvertently created, we must in part judge him from the point of view of the post-
colonial world we have inherited. From that perspective, we must acknowledge that 
despite his sometimes shrewd and far-seeing insights, his vision was blinkered and his 
choices often wrong.  
Tocqueville saw quite clearly that European imperialists had by their own failures 
created reactive violence and stimulated the growth of new nationalist ideologies. But he 
never thought these animosities could be lessened by any form of shared governance; 
rather he believed that Europeans must rule in the manner of better Turks in order to 
contain these enmities and let them dissipate slowly in the mists of time. Although he 
resisted the impulse of French philanthropists to see the conquered peoples as clay to be 
shaped, he saw them largely as a threat to be managed and controlled, a threat that would 
naturally recede as Arab populations dwindled. Seduced by the American example, 
Tocqueville mistakenly believed that time was on the side of the French in Algeria. But 
the situation of two peoples inhabiting a common space without equity and parity 
unraveled along the seams that Tocqueville’s own sensitivity to the dynamics of political 
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contributed to this ominous result, helping to set France on the course that he feared. 
Algeria did indeed become “a closed field, a walled arena, where the two peoples would 
have to fight without mercy, and where one of the two would have to die.”
85 Tocqueville 
was warning against the moral disaster of expelling or destroying the Arabs, but 
ironically it was French Algeria that died. The imperial voyage ended with the French 
being driven out of Africa in a traumatic period of decolonization that ended as it had 
begun: in debates over torture and atrocity. If Tocqueville was no more blind to this 
future calamity than most of his contemporaries, those with a deep affinity for 
Tocquevillean analysis have done him the honor of arguing that “more could have been 
expected of him.” 
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